![]() ![]() To be clear, a successful outcome in the Taiwan Strait will require a more capable U.S. forward deployed forces, and join up with other allies willing to fight. military time to surge into theater, augment U.S. At best, these programs are designed to strengthen Taiwan’s ability to stall Chinese progress, thereby providing the U.S. Finally, there is a $2 billion loan program for Taiwan’s military purchases, which could help further close the gap between the military Taipei needs and the one it currently has.Įven with these measures, Taiwan will still struggle to counter a Chinese invasion. military to arm Taiwan much more rapidly in a crisis by using U.S. As the Pentagon has demonstrated this year in Ukraine, drawdown authorities will allow the U.S. ![]() The NDAA also provides authorization for Taiwan to benefit from both Presidential Drawdown Authorities (up to $1 billion per year) and Special Defense Acquisition Funds. That builds valuable connections with their American counterparts. The legislation also specifically identifies Taiwan as a participant in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a great tool for training individual foreign officers and senior enlisted personnel. ![]() Demonstrating Congress’ seriousness, the section includes an increase in program authorization focusing on Taiwan contingencies of up to $300 million per fiscal year for three years. That’s essential because munitions would be depleted quickly in a conflict and traditional assumptions about the ability to resupply forces would not necessarily apply in conflict with China’s People’s Liberation Army. The NDAA also authorizes the Pentagon to establish a regional contingency stockpile for Taiwan that consists of munitions and other defense articles. Congress’ attention and oversight can help. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency that runs the arms sales process for the Pentagon issues world class press releases to announce sales but, despite individual staff efforts, the agency’s ability to deliver those capabilities at the speed of relevance is something less than world class. and allied inventories, it is not realistic to expect them before 2026 or 2027. Given the need to supply Ukraine and restock U.S. The sale was announced in 2020, but delivery may not be complete until 2029, barring urgent intervention.Įven more embarrassing is that more than 200 Javelin missiles and launchers and 250 Stinger systems were approved for sale to Taiwan in 2015 and have not been delivered. The delay in the delivery of the Harpoon coastal defense system and associated missiles to Taiwan is a perfect example. industrial capacity and a sluggish bureaucratic process dangerously disconnected from the serious threat the U.S. There is a nearly $19 billion backlog of weapons intended for Taiwan thanks to a persistent combination of insufficient U.S. Defense and State Departments to prioritize the delivery of arms to Taiwan. The legislation also includes much-needed guidance to the U.S. At least 85 percent of this annual foreign military financing must be spent in the United States, which will strengthen the U.S. If maximized, this is effectively a 10 percent to 12 percent increase in Taiwan’s defense spending and rewards Taiwan for getting its defense spending up to about 2.3 percent of its GDP. secretaries of defense and state can certify that Taiwan has increased its defense spending compared to the previous year. The NDAA includes investments in and support for Taiwan’s armed forces, such as the provision of up to $2 billion a year in Foreign Military Financing for Taiwan over five years if the U.S.
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